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Abstract:  This essay is part of a larger project aimed at making sense of rational thought and agency 
as part of the natural world.  It provides a semantic framework for thinking about the contents of: 1) 
descriptive thoughts and sentences having a representational or mind-to-world direction of fit, and 
which manifest our capacity for theoretical rationality; and 2) prescriptive and intentional sentences 
having an expressive or world-to-mind direction of fit, and which manifest our capacity for practical 
rationality.  I use a modified version of Allan Gibbard’s hyperstate semantics, employing both 
maximally determinate possible worlds and maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for 
providing a unified understanding of moral judgments and expressions of individual and collective 
intentionality – they one and all give voice to our ability as rational agents to adopt the perspectives of 
various individuals within a community and consider how we would behave were we in their 
positions.  In the course of spelling out the view I draw on and criticize ideas that Wilfrid Sellars 
advanced in the middle of the 20
th
 century, while employing the tools of contemporary modal logic 
and model-theoretic semantics to give perspicuous formulation to his thought that the moral judgment 
‘one ought to do A’ should be understood in terms of the collective intention ‘we shall do A’, where 
the pronoun denotes the unrestricted class of rational agents and the ‘ought’ is in some sense 
unconditionally binding.  
 
Keywords:  collective intentionality, deontic modality, expressivism, planning semantics, 
Sellarsian ethics 
 
11.1  INTRODUCTION:  THE MORAL ‘OUGHT’ AND THE INTENTIONAL ‘SHALL’ 
Though he is not often discussed alongside the ‘big four’ of collective intentionality 
(Bratman, Gilbert, Searle, and Tuomela)
1
, Wilfrid Sellars did much to stimulate interest in the 
subject in the middle of the 20
th
 century.  Over the course of a series of works addressing the 
nature of moral reasoning, Sellars developed an account of collective intentionality on the 
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 For the reference see the Introduction to Chant, Hindriks, and Preyer 2014.  For exceptions see Koons (this 
volume) Olen and Turner (2015), Peregrin (this volume), and Schweikard and Schmid (2013) §2.3. 
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basis of which to understand moral judgment (e.g. 1951, 1963, 1966a, 1966b, 1967a, chapter 
7 of 1968/1992, 1976, and 1980).  In doing so he outlined (here one could not say developed) 
a theory of the semantic functions of modal terms like ‘shall’, ‘ought’, and ‘could’.  His idea 
is that the assertion of a sentence like ‘bankers ought to dress professionally’ gives voice to a 
collective intention concerning what anyone in the community of bankers shall do.  Moral 
judgments are or involve a universalization of this collective intentionality across all rational 
beings:  use of the moral ‘ought’ is a way of giving voice to what any of us shall do where the 
‘us’ is unrestricted and where ‘shall’ connotes an intention-in-expression (as opposed to a 
claim that such an intention exists).  This idea relates judgments about what is right and 
wrong concerning exercises of instrumental practical rationality – which concern what anyone 
ought to do to achieve a particular end in a given situation – to judgments about what is right 
and wrong concerning morality.  And while the instrumental ‘ought’ concerns action that is 
directed at some end, and so its universality is circumscribed by that end as a condition on the 
force of the ‘ought’, the moral ‘ought’ is one whose force is in some sense unconditionally 
binding.   
In this regard Sellars sees himself spelling out a conception of human cognition 
consonant with Kant’s.
2
  Looking back, we can also understand this as an expressivist or non-
cognitivist analysis of moral judgment.
3
  While I will argue below that we have good reason 
to dispute some of what Sellars concludes about moral reasoning, collective intentionality, 
and the logic of the associated modals, I believe that in some areas he saw farther and more 
clearly than is commonly appreciated.  The last chapter of Science and Metaphysics contains a 
discussion of the different roles played by the contents of collective intentions as against their 
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 From the closing chapter of Science and Metaphysics (1968), a book whose subtitle is “Variations on Kantian 
Themes” (p.176): 
…in my opinion the metaphysics of morals is but a fragment of a broader critique of practical reason.  
3
 Though the term ‘expressivism’ was not then in common currency, Sellars occasionally discusses non-
cognitivism (usually in connection with emotivism) – cf (1967b).  See Klemick (2018) for a quasi-realist defense 




mode as collective, and of the two complementary directions of fit that characterize 
descriptive and intentional states of mind, that resonates today (its echoes of a classical 
pragmatist use of the scientific categories employed to understand neural activity as a basis 
for thinking about theoretical and practical rationality, however, have gone almost totally 
silent in the intervening years).  From pp.188-9: 
 
33….I can intend that someone else do A (intend him to do A), and he can intend to do 
A.…There is, nevertheless, an asymmetry.  For, obviously, only his intention can grow 
directly into his volition and his action.  My intention with respect to his action can grow 
into a volition only if practical reasoning draws a conclusion from it concerning some 
influence I can bring to bear. 
 
34. This latter consideration highlights the obvious fact that even where the descriptive 
content of two people’s intentions is in the strongest sense the same not only are the 
intendings numerically different, which is true even in the case of belief, but the total 
content of the intendings involves a special mode of egocentricity (expressed by the word 
‘shall’) which is, in practical discourse, the counterpart of the egocentricity of 
demonstratives.  The latter is the egocentricity involved in the impact of the world on 
discourse, the former is the egocentricity involved in the impact of discourse on the world 
in volition. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, and looking across decades of work on model 
theory as a basis for semantically evaluating different vocabularies, we can see not only that 
Sellars made some conceptual moves that are not forced upon us, but also that his survey of 
the terrain needs to be re-examined.  For Sellars left at best an outline for a semantics of moral 
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and intentional discourse, and while Koons (2019) offers a systematic elaboration and defense 
of Sellars’ ethics, and relates Sellars’ ethics to the work of Bratman, Gilbert, Tomasello, and 
Tuomela on collective intentionality, we still lack a semantic framework sufficient to unify 
the prescriptive and intentional modalities under a common conception of practical rationality 
(I use ‘deontic’ and ‘prescriptive’ interchangeably in this essay, concerning what agents 
ought, may, and are forbidden from doing).  There are also problems with the sketch of an 
account Sellars left.  By simply identifying deontic judgments with expressions of collective 
intentions (e.g. 1963, part 12, and 1968, p.219; Koons, chapter 5, also identifies ‘ought’ 
judgments with ‘shall’ judgments), it would appear that ‘we ought to A and we shall not A’ is 
rendered as the contradiction ‘we shall A and we shall not A’.  But though an assertion of the 
first sentence may involve some sort of practical irrationality, there is a non-empty mental 
state associated with it, as we’ve recognized for millennia – judgments such as these led the 
prophets to rend their clothes at what their communities were doing.  Where negation is a 
complementarity operator, however, an assertion of the second sentence has no associated 
mental state (I am glossing over issues of internal and external negation that are discussed in 
detail in sections 11.3.2 and 11.3.3).  At the same time, Sellars thinks that a judgment that one 
shall do something commits one to the claim that one will (e.g. at section 4 of 1963; though 
rejected by Ludwig 2016, p.115, this view is not uncommon in the literature on collective 
intentionality – cf. Bratman 2014 p.76, Mele 1989 p. 19 and the references in note 1, and 
Tuomela and Miller 1988 p.375).
4
  If we allow this implication to hold, and we identify ‘shall’ 
with ‘ought’, we need to make sure that commitment to the claim that one ought to do 
something does not also commit one to the claim that one will – for just as surely as ‘we 
                                                          
4
 Bratman (2014) notes that this condition is too strong to be a necessary condition on intention, Mele (1989) 
defends the weaker claim that if one intends to do something one at least does not believe that one will not, 
Tuomela and Miller (1988) hedge with a parenthetical claim that one at least believes that one probably will do 
what one intends, and in footnote 23 of (1963) Sellars includes a ceteris paribus clause.  These weaker 
commitments could be represented here instead of the stronger one, but as all are optional I stick to the simpler 
formulation so as to illustrate how to accommodate the view for those so inclined. 
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ought to do A and we shall not’ is coherent, so is ‘we ought to A and we will not’.  This again 
suggests distinguishing ‘ought’ from ‘shall’.  Additionally, if deontic judgments simply 
express collective intentions it is not clear how to understand the claim that something is 
permitted but not obliged (cf. Koons 2019 pp.132ff.).  And what sort of intentional state of 
mind is expressed when one says that the performance of some general act is obligatory, two 
of its specific instances are separately permitted, while one intends to do one or the other – 
e.g. ‘I ought to go to the lecture, I am permitted to sit in the front, I am permitted to sit in the 
back, and I shall sit in the front’? 
This essay grounds a unified conception of moral reasoning, individual and collective 
intentionality, and practical rationality on a solid semantic footing by using the resources of 
model theory and modal logic to supply an interpretation for a language that includes 
descriptive vocabulary, prescriptive vocabulary, and intentional vocabulary.  On this 
semantics representational interpretations are provided for descriptive vocabulary and 
expressivist interpretations are provided for prescriptive and intentional vocabulary.  Using a 
modified version of the plan-theoretic semantics presented in Gibbard (2003), my goal is to 
explicate the idea that both moral reasoning and collective intentionality can be understood as 
the exercise of practical rationality across perspectives of person, place, and time.  The result 
is a view on which descriptive sentences represent the space of possible worlds, while 
prescriptive and intentional sentences express commitment to plans of action that involve 
putting oneself into the shoes of others within a community.  The view diverges from Gibbard 
and Sellars in various ways (some of which I detail below) but the upshot is a semantics able 
to establish a number of implication relations that the descriptive ‘will’, the prescriptive 
‘ought’, and the intentional ‘shall’ ought to conform to.  I believe this framework will prove 
useful in sorting out some of the debate in the literature on collective intentionality, but my 
aim in this essay is to present the semantics, explain the resources its models employ, discuss 
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Sellars’ account alongside my own, and motivate the conclusion that there is more to be 
learned from studying views of this sort.  With the exception of a brief discussion of 
Bratman’s views on planning mental states as a basis of collective intentionality in section 
11.3.8, I defer to future work a comparison of this semantics with the views of the big four 
and the surrounding literature.   
Two final programmatic notes.  First, my focus here lies solely on intentions for 
action, and I leave questions about collective attention, thought, and other mental states 
undiscussed.  Second, as my interest lies in the modal reasoning and judgment that attends 
practical rationality I do not discuss modalities for non-agentive normative evaluation, e.g. 
concerning how organisms and artifacts ought to be or behave. 
 
11.2  A DEONTIC HYPERSTATE SEMANTICS 
11.2.1  BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK 
In other work (Manuscript) I show that by taking a class of atomic descriptive sentences 
interpreted via possible worlds, a class of atomic prescriptive sentences interpreted via plans 
of action of the sort discussed below, and the standard set-theoretic definitions for the 
Boolean operators, the content of any mixed or pure descriptive and prescriptive sentence can 
be recursively modelled, where the mind-to-world descriptive function and the world-to-mind 
prescriptive function is kept distinct.  In this part of the essay I present an abbreviated 
formulation of that semantics, and in 11.3 I discuss its extension to account for intentional 
sentences. 
The central semantic concept is the notion of a hyperstate, introduced in Gibbard 
(2003) and understood as an ordered pair of a maximally determinate possible world and a 
maximally determinate plan of action (a hyperplan).  Think of a hyperplan as a specification 
of what a person would do at every possible point of choice, including situations where one is 
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other people – and so a hyperplan specifies what to do if one were Caesar faced with crossing 
the Rubicon, or a colleague faced with the choice of whether or not to attend a lecture.  Just as 
descriptive mental states, having a mind-to-world direction of fit, can be understood as sets of 
possible worlds (the worlds at which the descriptions are true), so can prescriptive mental 
states, having a world-to-mind direction of fit, be understood as sets of plans of action (the 
plans where the agent, or the members of a class of agents, chooses to do the thing 
prescribed).  Because a hyperstate includes both a world and a plan, it is possible to 
distinguish various features of the contributions that descriptive and prescriptive or deontic 
thoughts make to our cognitive economy.   
While the semantic values of descriptive and prescriptive sentences can be provided 
on this basis, a straightforward extension of this framework would use these hyperstates to 
model the contents of intentional sentences as well.  This leads to the problem that the 
sentence ‘we ought to A and we shall not A’ becomes the contradiction ‘we shall A and we 
shall not A’, however.  And so in 11.3 I distinguish deontic hyperplans from intentional 
hyperplans, and I define a deontic-intentional hyperstate as an ordered triple of a possible 
world, a deontic hyperplan, and an intentional hyperplan.  But I begin here because the 
ordered pairs – and the descriptive/prescriptive fragment of the language – are simpler to 
work with.   
 
11.2.2  SINGLE-MINDEDNESS AND INDIFFERENCE 
The deontic hyperplans that model prescriptive mental states require that we distinguish two 
different ways of choosing – single-mindedly and indifferently.  To forecast, one chooses an 
action single-mindedly when one regards it as obliged and one chooses an action indifferently 
when one regards it as merely permitted – thus, belief that one ought to attend the lecture and 
that one is permitted to sit in either the front or the back of the room will be understood as a 
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plan to choose single-mindedly to attend the lecture while choosing indifferently whether to 
sit in the front or the back.  The distinction between these two choice attitudes has gone 
neglected in the literature on planning expressivism.  While it is discussed in Gibbard (2003), 
that discussion has been seldom mentioned by his critics.  Silk (2015 p.53, footnote 8) notes 
that by passing over this distinction many of Gibbard’s critics have not done service to his 
view.  Dreier (2006, 2009) advances a similar distinction, using the same terminology, but 
without noting its occurrence in Gibbard.  Interestingly, Sellars introduced the same 
distinction in his own work (e.g. 1966b pp.113-115 and 1976 p.57), using the very same terms 
that both Gibbard and Dreier use, though to my knowledge he never discusses it in any detail 
(after introducing the distinction in the latter essay Sellars writes “but I am concerned to 
sketch rather than map”).  As neither Gibbard nor Dreier note that Sellars discusses this 
distinction, it appears that the notions of single-minded and indifferent choice attitudes have 
been independently developed at least three times in the last half century.
5
  These notions are 
absolutely central to a planning semantics for the deontic modalities, however.  For in order to 
distinguish the strong and weak deontic modalities of obligation/forbiddance and permission, 
each point of choice on a deontic hyperplan must be specified according to whether the 
decisions undertaken are done so either single-mindedly or indifferently.  The hyperplans that 
model intentional mental states do not need to mark this distinction, however (why this is so 
will become clear below).  That is, each point of choice on an intentional hyperplan 
(introduced in 11.3) specifies only which actions are taken and which are not, without regard 
for the attitudes under which the choices are made.  This indicates, I will suggest, that the 
intentional state of mind, whether individual or collective, is a less cognitively demanding and 
conceptually sophisticated sort of mental state than the state we express when we issue 
                                                          
5
 Sellars, Gibbard, and Dreier each speak of preferential and indifferent choices, but because one might suppose 
that any choice exhibits one’s preferences I choose to contrast indifference with single-mindedness.  And as I 
provide my own definition of indifference in terms of single-mindedness I will use this terminology. 
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prescriptions under the deontic modalities (this also motivates keeping two sets of books for 
deontic and intentional plans).
6
  
The notion of a single-minded choice is to be understood through the attitude of 
rejection, and the indifferent choice can be introduced on this basis (Gibbard introduces talk 
of rejection, but the definition of indifference in terms of rejection and single-mindedness is 
my own).  Just as one can believe that some state of affairs obtains, so can one reject some 
course of action.  An agent chooses an action A single-mindedly when she rejects every 
action B that is incompatible with A (rejection is a term of art in this sense).  An agent 
chooses an action A indifferently just in case there is some action B that is 1) incompatible 
with A and 2) is such that she could have picked B without changing any of her single-minded 
choices.  When an agent makes a choice indifferently she has rejected rejecting each of the 
choices that she could take without changing any of her single-minded choices.  Thus, it is of 
the nature of both single-mindedness and indifference that one who chooses from these 
frames of mind is at the same time attitudinally related to choices she does not undertake.  
The intentional choice may, however, be specified solely in terms of the choice itself; this 
again suggests that the deontic frame of mind involves a sort of cognitive sophistication that 
the merely intentional does not. 
It is clear that we can be in these planning states of mind, and the mental states 
associated with the assertions of sentences concerning what is forbidden, what is obliged, and 
what is permitted can be specified in terms of them.  For instance, suppose I have decided that 
I ought not go home early this afternoon, that I ought to go to the department colloquium, and 
that it is both permissible that I sit in the front of the room and permissible that I sit in the 
back of the room.  In this circumstance my mental state includes rejecting going home and 
rejecting not going to the talk, modelled by the set of hyperplans where I single-mindedly 
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 I examine relations of conceptual and ontological priority among deontic, individually intentional, and 
collectively intentional mental states in (Forthcoming). 
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choose to go to the talk by rejecting every choice that is incompatible with going to the talk – 
including, among other things, the choice to go home.  If I do not change my mind when it 
comes time to attend the talk, then I actualize this planning mental state by choosing single-
mindedly to go to the talk.  Finally, believing that both sitting in the front of the room and 
sitting in the back of the room are permitted is a mental state modelled by the set of plans 
where I variously choose indifferently to sit in the front of the room and indifferently to sit in 
the back of the room.  When it comes time to act on one plan rather than the other I actualize 
the plan in question by choosing indifferently between those choices, which is to say I reject 
rejecting the alternative (the option I could have undertaken without changing any of my 
single-minded choices).  And so should I choose to sit in the front of the room that choice is 
both an indifferent choice to sit in the front of the room and an indifferent choice not to sit in 
the back of the room. 
 
11.2.3  A HYPERSTATE SEMANTICS FOR DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE SENTENCES 
In order to model sentences concerning what restricted classes of people ought to do in 
specific circumstances, it will occasionally be useful to talk about types of circumstances 
(weeknights, weeknights where there is a colloquium talk, etc.), kinds of actions (walking to a 
colloquium talk, walking quickly to a colloquium talk, etc.), and classes of agents (all of the 
people in my department, all philosophers, etc.).  Tradeoffs can be made in terms of where we 
locate complexity, and for the semantics of prescriptive sentences I will assume that 
circumstances include information about the classes of agent(s) who make choices there, 
while keeping kinds of action separate from the circumstances in which they occur.
7
  E.g., 
deontic hyperplans concerning how everyone in my department should dress for work will be 
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framed in terms of what the unrestricted class of agents would do were they to find 
themselves in a circumstance where they are members of my department faced with the 
choice of how to dress for work.  A language that included kind-restricted quantifiers could be 
supplied a semantics that distinguishes the non-universal classes of agents to which 
prescriptions apply from their circumstances of action.  The introduction of quantificational 
devices would also facilitate a treatment of de re and de dicto modality, but doing so would 
require relativizing semantic values to points of evaluation and such a discussion would take 
us too far afield (see the Appendix for a brief overview of these issues).  In future work I 
hope to examine the interaction between quantification and modality on a hyperstate 
semantics in more detail, but here I treat prescriptions as applying universally and build their 
restricted applications into the circumstance condition.  Additionally, all deontic modality 
over sentences concerning groups of people should be read de dicto (though again, see the 
Appendix for a discussion of de re and de dicto modality). 
Consider a language L  consisting of atomic descriptive sentences, atomic sentences 
falling under one of the deontic modalities of obligation, permission, and forbiddance, and the 
sentences composed from these together with the Boolean operators.  Hyperstates can be used 
to provide a semantic evaluation on which the descriptive sentences represent the space of 
possible worlds and the prescriptive sentences express plans of action.  Let a possible world w 
be defined as a maximally consistent set of true sentences.  That is, for every descriptive 
sentence d ∈ L and every w, either d is true at w or ~d is true at w.  The content of a 
descriptive sentence can then be understood as the set of worlds at which it is true.  In this 
regard descriptive sentences can be understood as representations of the space of possible 
worlds.  Plans of action are defined in terms of the choices made on them, where these plans 
are maximal in the sense that they specify what anyone would do at any every of choice.  
More precisely, let a deontic hyperplan hD be defined as a maximally consistent plan of action 
12 
 
such that, for every circumstance C, every agent α able to make a choice at C, and every 
action A that α is able to choose to perform at C, either (exclusively): 
 
1) α single-mindedly chooses to A at C on hD; or 
2) α single-mindedly chooses not to A at C on hD; or 
3) α indifferently chooses to A at C on hD; or 
4) α indifferently chooses not to A at C on hD. 
 
Officially α is a metalinguistic variable but I abuse notation and occasionally treat it as an 
instance in the object language (e.g. in 11.3.8). 
Various requirements that a semantics must meet in order to model our notion of 
agency correspond to restrictions placed on the relations among hyperplans.  For instance, 
notice that in general one undertakes many actions at a single point of choice—viz., to choose 
to attend the department colloquium this afternoon is also to choose not to go home early.  
Whatever determinate inclusions and exclusions may obtain among choices should be 
reflected in the plans we use to think about them.  It would also seem part of the logic of 
agency that wherever it is possible to plan to do something then it is also possible to plan not 
to do it, understood de dicto in the sense that one could plan to do what one takes to be 
something else.  In the branching-times framework of Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (2001), 
employing the ‘sees to it that’ modal operator for talk of agency, this is represented by a 
requirement that where it is possible to see to it that something is the case it is also possible to 
not see to it that it is the case – there is no agency where an agent could not have done 
otherwise (this is the ‘negative requirement’ on agency, discussed at pp.36-7).  If that is right, 
and if our talk of intention inherits the logic of our talk of agency, then the following is a 
plausible condition to impose on the notion of a hyperplan.  With ‘h1’ and ‘h2’ ranging over 
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deontic and intentional hyperplans (introduced in 11.3), and with ‘chooses*’ ranging over 
‘chooses indifferently’, ‘chooses single-mindedly’, and ‘chooses’ (the third case is to ensure 
that intentional hyperplans also meet this condition): 
 
GENUINE AGENCY:  ∀α∀A∀C∀h1[if α chooses* to A at C on h1 then ∃h2(α chooses* not to 
A at C on h2)] 
 
GENUINE AGENCY says that for any plan on which one chooses to do something (perhaps 
under a particular attitude) there is another plan on which one chooses (under that same 
attitude) not to do so.   
Let a deontic hyperstate <w, hD> be an ordered pair of a possible world and a deontic 
hyperplan and let SD denote the set of deontic hyperstates.  That is, where ‘W’ denotes the set 
of possible worlds and ‘HD’ denotes the set of deontic hyperplans, a deontic hyperstate <w, 
hD> ∈ SD is an element of the Cartesian product of W and HD.  The contents of states of mind 
voiced with descriptive and prescriptive sentences are given by the world and choice 
components of deontic hyperstates (from here on I tend to trade talk of states of mind for the 
contents of the sentences used to convey them).  Where [[φ]] denotes the content of a 
sentence φ ∈ L  under a given interepretation, for descriptive sentences d we have: 
 
[[d]] =def. {<w, hD>:  d is true at w} 
 
For prescriptive sentences we distinguish three varieties, corresponding to deontic judgments 
concerning what is forbidden, what is obliged, and what is permitted.  Schematically, the 
contents of the three kinds of deontic sentence are determined as follows.  An assertion of 




[[people are obliged to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD>:  for every α, α single-mindedly chooses 
to A in C on hD} 
 
Thus, the content of ‘my colleagues are obliged to go to colloquia’ is the set of hyperstates 
whose hyperplans are such that every person who is in a circumstance of being my colleague 
and faced with a choice of either going or not going to a colloquium chooses single-mindedly 
to go.  This will include, e.g., plans where a colleague chooses indifferently to sit in the front 
of the room, chooses indifferently to sit in the back, etc., so long as these choices are also 
ones where the agent chooses single-mindedly to go to the colloquium.  To say that my 
colleagues are obliged to go to colloquia, then, is to express commitment to a plan concerning 
what I would single-mindedly do were I anyone of my colleagues. 
Similarly, an utterance of ‘people are forbidden to A in C’ expresses universally 
rejecting doing A in C: 
 
[[people are forbidden to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD>:  for every α, α single-mindedly 
chooses not to A in C on hD} 
 
And so the content of the thought given voice with an utterance of ‘my colleagues are 
forbidden from going to colloquia’ is the set of hyperstates whose hyperplans are such that 
every person who is my colleague and faced with the choice of going to a colloquium chooses 
single-mindedly not to go. 
Finally, the assertion of ‘people are permitted to A in C’ expresses universally rejecting 




[[people are permitted to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD>:  for every α, α either single-mindedly 
chooses to A in C or indifferently chooses whether or not to A in C on hD} 
 
The content of the thought that my colleagues are permitted to go to colloquia is therefore the 
set of hyperstates whose hyperplans are such that every colleague of mine who is in a 
circumstance of being faced with attending a colloquium either chooses single-mindedly to 
go, or chooses indifferently whether or not to go (this allows for individual hyperplans where 
an agent sometimes chooses to indifferently to go and sometimes chooses indifferently not to 
go).  In this case the only hyperstates ruled out are those whose hyperplans include colleagues 
who choose single-mindedly not to go.  It is easily established that where negation is a 
complementarity operator, understood in terms of rejection for prescriptive sentences, these 
three kinds of state of mind bear all the right duals with negation (when something is not 
forbidden it is permitted, when it is not obliged one is permitted not to do it, etc. – see 
Manuscript for details). 
 
11.3  A DEONTIC-INTENTIONAL HYPERSTATE SEMANTICS 
11.3.1  FROM DEONTIC PRESCRIPTION TO ‘WE-SHALL’ INTENTION 
According to this proposal, when everyone in my department shares the mental state of being 
in agreement about how we ought to comport ourselves at a colloquium, we are in a state of 
mind wherein we each agree on what we would do were we anyone else in the department.  
To plan in this sort of way is to think of oneself as a member of a group whose other members 
we relate to as if we could make their choices for them.  This feature of the planning 
apparatus discharges a key commitment in Sellars’ theory of moral judgment.  For on this 
account a moral judgment that one ought to do A expresses a plan, were one anyone, 
anywhere, at any time (where A-ing is at issue) to choose to do A.  And so the capacity for 
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reasoning in a moral frame of mind is the universalization, over person, place, and time, of the 
practically rational capacity to plan one’s life.  In this section I extend this treatment by 
providing a hyperstate semantics for individual and collective intentions.   
 
11.3.2  SELLARSIAN ‘SHALL’S 
As I mentioned at the start of the essay, I think we have good reason to question some of the 
commitments Sellars takes on.  Perhaps most surprisingly, he held that judgments using the 
‘shall’ operator do not fall under the scope of logical operators.  He also repeatedly examines 
problems with negation without arriving at a satisfactory picture of the interaction between 
negation and intentional vocabulary.  Sellars’ reasoning for denying that ‘shall’ sentences 
logically compose with other sentences is not above criticism.  For one thing, it raises 
problems of compositionality for a language containing both descriptive and non-descriptive 
sentences.  Koons (2019, pp.132ff.) examines this point in some detail and concludes that we 
should allow for embedded ‘shall’ sentences.  It is also not clear that Sellars, by his own 
lights, should bar ‘shall’ from embedding.  For he is happy to talk about implications among 
statements of intention.  In a footnote at p.115 of (1966b) he defends this by asserting that 
“the relation word ‘implies’…is not a truth-functional connective [and] is in the 
metalanguage, and mentions rather than uses the shall-sentences” (emphasis in the original).  
This is a curious position for one who, thirteen years earlier (1953), had argued that 
metalinguistic claims about inferential relations among sentences could be understood in 
terms of object-language claims that use conditionals.  And so insofar as Sellars allows 
metalinguistic implications like  
 




one would expect him to allow object-language sentences like  
 
if I shall walk quickly to the colloquium talk, then I shall walk to the colloquium talk 
 
Perhaps that sounds stilted.  But there would seem to be a perfectly sensible state of mind 
associated with that conditional.  At any rate, I mean to allow ‘shall’ sentences to embed 
arbitrarily under the Boolean operators and I defer a consideration of non-Boolean implication 
for another time. 
There are also issues with Sellars’ discussion of negation, as it was his contention that 
‘shall’ sentences cannot be externally negated in any sense that differs from their internally-
negated variants.  Sellars’ discussion of external and internal negation is more substantial, 
however, and he examines the issue across a number of texts (especially 1963, 1966b, and 
chapter 7 of 1968; see also Klemick 2018 §2 and Koons 2019, chapter 5, the latter containing 
an extended discussion of Sellars’ standpoint on negation and ‘shall’).  His central concern is 
that ‘ought’ clearly distinguishes an external from an internal negation: ‘it is not the case that 
you ought to A’ differs in meaning from ‘you ought not A’ – the former marks a permission, 
the latter something forbidden.  This is a problem for Sellars because he wants to analyze 
‘ought’ in terms of the collective ‘shall’, and he does not think that ‘I shall not A’ and ‘it is 
not the case that I shall A’ marks a similar sort of distinction.  His commitment to the 
equivalence between ‘ought’ and ‘shall’ thereby requires that he explain why, as he claims, 
expressions of individual intention do not distinguish internal and external negation while 
expressions for collective intentions, or the deontic expressions that go proxy for them, do.
8
  
In parts 11 and 12 of (1963), an essay that is cited at a footnote of p.185 of (1968) as the point 
                                                          
8
 There are other features of Sellars’ account that a fuller story would have to look out.  For instance, I will have 
nothing to say about Sellars’ claim that intentions can at most conflict but not contradict, nor his understand of 
the relationship between truth and negation. 
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of contact for his understanding of negation in practical contexts, Sellars argues that ‘ought’ 
has an external negation because of the intersubjectivity of ‘ought’ claims.  At the end of part 
12 he writes (emphasis in the original; notice the use of ‘ordinary’ in the second sentence, 
apparently referencing individual rather than collective intentions – my thanks to Jim O’Shea 
for pointing this out): 
 
Let me now bring all these considerations together.  I suggest that the fact that ought-
statements, unlike ordinary shall-statements, have a proper negation is built on the shared 
intending expressed by “ought”.  In other words, the syntactical intersubjectivity of ought-
statements which [makes it possible that two ought-statements contradict each other], and 
which consists in the existence of the form “not-ought[X doing A]” in addition to the form 
“ought[X not doing A]” rests on the intersubjectivity of the intention expressed by ought-
statements. 
 
It is true that expressions of collective intention, as with expressions of moral 
judgment, share the feature that they are in principle part of an intersubjective space of 
practical reasoning within some community.  But we can register this point without 
conceiving of moral reasoning is a species of collective intentionality, and when we do we 
free ourselves of the need to explain why ‘ought’ has an external negation while ‘shall’ does 
not.  Sellars faces that need only because he defined ‘ought’ in terms of ‘shall’—in the 
paragraph preceding the one just quoted Sellars writes (emphasis in the original) “I suggest 
that ought, as an expression of intention, is a special case of shallwe”.  Koons (2019), chapter 
5, follows Sellars in this identification and argues that we should distinguish external from 
internal negation for ‘shallwe’.  I do not think we should identify ‘ought’ with ‘shallwe’, or 
otherwise define the former in terms of the latter.  These two modes of expression can be 
19 
 
understood in terms of the general notion of planning, and in that regard they are species of 
the genus practical rationality.  But as species they are differentiated separately – whereas the 
plans that model the deontic modalities distinguish the single-minded from the indifferent 
choice, the plans that model the intentional modalities do not.   
 
11.3.3  ISSUES OF ‘SHALL’ AND ‘NOT’ 
As I see it, there are three questions in play here.  First, there’s the question of whether we can 
frame a semantics on which sentences containing ‘shall’ and ‘ought’ have the right kinds of 
logical properties.  This is a question to be decided by formal considerations and the 
metaphysics of the models we use to interpret the language under consideration, together with 
whatever arguments we give for whatever logical properties we think the semantics ought to 
have.  Second, there is the question of whether ‘shall’ has a dual, as ‘obligation’ does with 
‘permission’ and ‘necessity’ does with ‘possibility’.  An answer to this question will be 
closely connected to the answer one gives to the first, on account of the fact that internally 
and externally negated ‘ought’ claims clearly differ in meaning, where the strong force of 
forbiddance, defined by an internally-negated ‘ought’ claim (one ought not A—i.e., it is 
forbidden to A) is distinguished from the externally-negated ‘ought’ claims that mark the 
weak force of permission (it is not the case that one ought to A—it is permitted not to A).  
Finally, there is the question of whether saying that one shall not do something is equivalent 
to saying that it is not the case that one shall do it – this is a question of whether ‘shall’, in 
either its individual or collective guise, as a matter of the grammar of English (or the pidgin-
English spoken by a community of philosophers), distinguishes an internal and an external 
negation. 
Concerning the first question, the GENUINE AGENCY condition and the fact that 
intentional hyperplans do not distinguish single-minded from indifferent choices ensures that 
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for any action A an agent is capable of undertaking, an externally-negated ‘shall’ sentence 
(whether individual or collective) is equivalent to an internally-negated one (see proof in 
11.3.7).
9
  And so from plausible assumptions about the nature of our planning agency it 
follows that there is no distinct external negation for ‘shall’.  While this entailment is 
grounded in the metaphysics of agency, there is no corresponding entailment that the absence 
of an intention to do something is the intention not to do it, however.  That second entailment 
corresponds to a descriptive claim about the ontology of intentions, and it would be reflected 
in a relation among the world elements of hyperstates.  But the equivalence between ‘shall 
not’ and ‘not shall’ is a claim about the logic of sentences expressing intentional agency:  any 
time one expresses that it is not the case that one shall do A, one has thereby expressed that 
one shall not do A.  Nevertheless, we can preserve a distinct internal and external negation for 
the deontic modalities, and this feature of the language is captured by the fact that the 
hyperplans used for interpreting the expressions of deontic judgment specify whether a choice 
is made single-mindedly or indifferently.  The distinction between single-mindedness and 
indifference thereby answers the second question by ensuring that the duality of the deontic 
modalities is semantically marked, while the absence of that distinction for the semantic 
evaluation of the intentional operator ‘shall’, together with plausible assumptions about the 
nature of agency, ensures that ‘shall’ has no dual.   
It is of note that the absence of a discussion of Gibbard’s use of this distinction 
between two ways of choosing led Schroeder (2008) and Dreier (2006, 2009) to accuse 
Gibbard (2003) of being unable to distinguish internal and external negation for the deontic 
modalities.  But that distinction in choice types is needed for the deontic modalities precisely 
so as to account for the difference between these two sorts of negations, and the associated 
                                                          
9
 The restriction to actions the agent is capable of undertaking rules out cases like ‘it is not the case that I shall 
make the sun explode’, which should be understood as descriptive claims that one lacks a particular intention 
(the expressive intentional thought can be captured with ‘it is not the case that I shall try, etc.).  If we allow 
hyperplans to include actions that are apparently impossible, this restriction can be lifted. 
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difference between the strong and weak deontic modality.  But where there is no 
corresponding difference in negation (and no associated duality) for the intentional operator 
‘shall’, there is no need to distinguish single-mindedness from indifference in mere intention, 
whether individual or collective.  By not properly accounting for the distinction between the 
single-minded and the indifferent choice, Sellars (though he was apparently the first to note 
this distinction) made the mistake of assimilating the intentional modalities to the deontic and 
was then faced with the puzzle of why there is external negation for the latter.  Schroeder and 
Dreier made the converse mistake, in their reading of Gibbard, by effectively assimilating the 
deontic modalities to the intentional and then puzzling over an apparent lack of the two 
different sorts of negation.  It is only when we keep the distinction between deontic and 
intentional expressions in mind, by distinguishing the single-minded and the indifferent 
choice for the former and not the latter, that we avoid misconceiving things like the 
interaction between negation and the various modalities in a plan-theoretic semantics.  And 
that, I have argued, is a matter of seeing the deontic judgment and the collective intention as 
two species of the genus of practical rationality rather than as species of a genus of one 
another. 
There is another reason for distinguishing the intentional from the deontic mental 
state.  When I introduced the distinction between single-mindedness and indifference in 
11.2.2, I noted some features of these attitudes that suggest the deontic frame of mind 
involves more cognitive sophistication than the intentional.  Among these was the fact that the 
ability to discriminate an indifferent from a single-minded choice, via the capacity for 
rejection, requires that one has attitudes toward other actions that one does not undertake.  
The intentional state of mind, however, only requires that one be affectively directed toward 
whatever one decides to do.  The ability to discriminate what one rejects from what one 
rejects rejecting, however, allows one to mark off practical species or determinations from 
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practical genera or determinables (e.g. attending the colloquium in the front or back of the 
room and attending the colloquium).  Once again it appears that the merely intentional mental 
state, whether individual or collective, is a cognitively less sophisticated form of thinking than 
the deontic, and this again supports keeping two sets of books on the plans they involve.  
Finally, concerning the question of whether or not the expression ‘not shall’ makes 
sense in English, or whether it and ‘shall not’ always have the same meaning, I do not think it 
obvious one way or the other.  But the resources of modal logic help clarify the space of 
options.  We can see this by considering analogous cases with the temporal modality ‘will’.  
Because ‘it will be that A’ and ‘it is not the case that it will be that A’ (using the external 
negation) are clearly incompatible, we can discern cases where the external negation is not 
equivalent to an internal negation by looking for contexts where ‘it will be that A and it will 
not be that A’ (using the internal negation) is coherent.  Suppose you are considering coming 
by my office sometime tomorrow but have not specified when.  If you ask me whether I will 
be in, I might say ‘I will be in my office tomorrow and I won’t be in my office tomorrow’.  
This sounds sensible where there is an implicit quantification over moments of time, and it 
does not turn on features of agency.  ‘There will be life on Mars and there won’t be life on 
Mars’ is also acceptable when ‘will’ is understood as quantifying over different moments.  
Similar uses might be accepted with ‘shall’.  Suppose a company is deciding whether to hire a 
taxi service to take its employees to and from work.  When asked whether an employee would 
use the service, a claim like ‘I shall take the taxi and I shall not take the taxi’, if a bit jarring, 
seems to make sense in context.  As with the temporal modality, its sensibility turns on an 
implicit quantification over times. 
I grant that these examples are not dispositive.  But we can make these implicit 
quantifications explicit, and in temporal logic it is common to treat ‘will’ as a modal operator 
explicitly quantifying over times either universally (‘will-always’) or existentially (‘will-
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sometimes’ – see the discussion at Belnap, Perloff, and Xu pp.32, 152 and 243).  Here 
questions of internal and external negation intersect with the issue of whether a modality has a 
dual.  When explicitly quantifying over temporal moments, ‘will’ operators have duals:  e.g., 
‘it is not the case that it will-sometimes be that φ’ and  ‘it will-sometimes not be that φ’ in 
general have different semantic values, and the strong modal ‘will-always’ can be defined 
thereby.  There appear to be two ways forward, then.  If we treat ‘shall’ as either ‘shall-
always’ or ‘shall-sometimes’ then ‘shall’ will have both a strong and a weak mode and 
internally and externally negated shall-sentences will receive different semantic evaluations.  
On the other hand, we can stick to the simple ‘shall’ locution and let our commitments 
concerning the metaphysics of agency determine that internal and external negations for shall 
sentences are equivalent.
10
  I choose the latter option, but principally for simplicity.  It may be 
that ‘shall-always’ or ‘shall-sometimes’ are implicitly used in different circumstances, and 
attention to individual cases might allow one to discriminate features of context, or of the 
meanings of individual expressions, that serve to specify one or the other uses.  For instance, 
collateral commitments about what we take actions of this sort to involve make it seem that a 
claim like ‘I shall give to the poor’ either implicitly refers to a particular occurrence of choice 
(e.g., when I get my next paycheck) or existentially quantifies over circumstances – one can 
utter a sentence like this without meaning to express commitment to a plan to give to the poor 
at every point of choice where there is an option to do so.  But a sentence like “I shall be more 
polite to my neighbors” seems to involve universal (or at least general) quantification over 
circumstances.  Features of the meanings associated with the predicates ‘giving to the poor’ 
                                                          
10
 It is also possible to eliminate the distinction between internal and external negation while using a 
quantificational definition for ‘shall’.  We do so by requiring that the circumstance parameter for ‘shall’ specifies 
the moment at which the intention is to be realized, in which case any external negation for a ‘shall-always’ or 
‘shall-sometimes’ sentence will be equivalent to an internal negation.  Comparison with ‘will’ is again 
constructive:  talk of what is ‘sometimes’ or ‘always’ the case becomes otiose when ‘will’ is evaluated at 
individual moments, and under a given interpretation two sentences like ‘it is not the case that I will be home at 
4:00 pm today’ and ‘I will not be home at 4:00 pm today’ have the same semantic value.
 
 See the discussion of 
the At-instt operator in Belnap, Perloff, and Xu (2001), pp.152 and 242-3. 
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and ‘being more polite to one’s neighbors’ may play a role in determining which sort of 
reading one gets (this bears comparison with Koons’ discussion of material practical 
inferences in 2019, chapter 6).  
 
11.3.4  INTENTIONAL HYPERPLANS AND NON-AKRATIC HYPERSTATES 
Let an intentional hyperplan hI ∈ HI be a maximally determinate plan for what one would 
choose to do in any circumstance, including what one would do if one were other people.  In 
this case, however, the distinction between indifferent and single-minded choices is irrelevant.  
That is, an intentional hyperplan hI is a maximally consistent plan of action such that, for 
every circumstance C, every agent α able to make a choice at C, and every action A that α is 
able to choose to perform at C, either (exclusively):  
 
1) α chooses to A at C on hI; or 
2) α chooses not to A at C on hI 
 
The set of deontic-intentional hyperstates SDI consists of a set of ordered triples of a world, a 
deontic hyperplan, and an intentional hyperplan.  I use ‘<w, hD, hI>’ to denote elements of 
SDI.  Finally, I ensure that the claim that one shall do something commits one to the claim that 
one will by semantically evaluating shall-sentences with regard to non-akratic deontic-
intentional hyperstates, denoted ‘SNADI’ where a deontic-intentional hyperstate s ∈ SDI is non-
akratic just in case every choice that is part of the intentional hyperplan hI of s is such that the 
action in question will occur in the world of s (I am suppressing a modal interpretation of 




s ∈ SNADI iff [s ∈ SDI and ∀α∀A∀C(if α chooses (not) to A in C on hI of s, then ‘α will 




I use ‘<w, hD, hI>NA’ to denote non-akratic deontic-intentional hyperstates, which I will call 
‘deontic-intentional hyperstates’ from here on.  One who rejects the implication that to say 
one shall do something is to commit oneself to the claim that one will would not use non-
akratic hyperstates in the definitions that follow.   
 
11.3.5  A HYPERSTATE SEMANTICS FOR DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE SENTENCES, 
REVISED 
The definitions for atomic descriptive sentences and the three kinds of prescriptive sentences 
can now be given in terms of deontic-intentional hyperstates.  For descriptive sentences d: 
 
[[d]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  d is true at w} 
  
‘people are obliged to A in C’ expresses universally rejecting not doing A in C 
[[people are obliged to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  for every α, α single-mindedly 
chooses to A in C on hD} 
 
‘people are forbidden to A in C’ expresses universally rejecting doing A in C 
[[people are forbidden to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  for every α, α single-mindedly 
chooses not to A in C on hD} 
 
                                                          
11
 Notice that in the antecedent ‘α chooses (not) to A in C’ denotes part of a plan and in the consequent ‘α will 
choose (not) to A in C’ denotes a part of a world.  Notational variation could disambiguate these two uses, but at 
the cost of a more barbarous text. 
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‘people are permitted to A in C’ expresses universally rejecting rejecting doing A in C 
[[people are permitted to A in C]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  for every α, α either single-
mindedly chooses to A in C or indifferently chooses whether or not to A in C on hD} 
 
11.3.6  INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS 
As the sentences that give voice to intentions use first-person pronouns, to simplify the 
presentation I use ‘ι’ as a variable taking either ‘I’ or ‘we’ as its value.  Against this 
background, ‘ι shall A in C’ expresses commitment to the set of deontic-intentional 
hyperstates where everyone who is one of the group determined by the pronoun chooses to A 
in C in the corresponding intentional hyperplans:   
 
[[ι shall A in C]] =def. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  ι choose to A in C on hI} 
 
Similarly, to assert ‘ι shall not A in C’ is to express commitment to the complement of this set 
of deontic-intentional hyperstates, which is the set where ι choose not to A in C in the 
intentional hyperplan of that hyperstate.   
Notice that I distinguish the class of agents to which an intention applies from the 
circumstances in which the intention is realized, rather than building the restriction to the 
class into the specification of the circumstance as I did with prescriptive sentences.  One 
could accomplish the same result by continuing to use a variable ‘α’ that ranges over the 
unrestricted class of agents and specify that the circumstance in question is one that concerns 
how either I or one of us would behave, denoted ‘Cι’: 
 




As it is useful to keep track of the agents separately from their circumstances of action when 
dealing with intentions, I shall stick to the former definition. 
 
11.3.7  SOME FEATURES OF A DEONTIC-INTENTIONAL HYPERSTATE SEMANTICS 
Various desirable features of the logic of intentions, prescriptions, and descriptions can be 
established on this semantics.  The proofs proceed by showing that the corresponding subset 
relations obtain among the semantic values of these sentences under an interpretation.  For 
instance, commitment to ‘ι shall A in C’ commits one to ‘ι will A in C’:  
 
Proof:  [[ι shall A in C]] ⊆ [[ι will A in C]] 
By the definition of ‘shall’, [[ι shall A in C]] = {<w, hD, hI>NA:  ι choose to A in C on hI}.  
Because these triples are non-akratic, it follows that every world in that triple is one where 
ι will A in C.  But that means that the semantic value of ‘ι shall A in C’ is a subset of the 
semantic value of ‘ι will A in C’. 
 
Of course, one may sincerely assert ‘I/we shall A in C’ without oneself or one’s group doing 
A in C – this is once again a claim about the inferential relations among claims rather than 
ontological relations among facts.  Just so, notice that an assertion of the descriptive claim ‘α 
intends to A in C’ (which does not express an intention but reports on its existence), even 
where ‘α’ denotes the speaker, does not commit one to the claim that ‘α will A in C’.  This is 
reflected in the fact that the semantic value of ‘α intends to A in C’ is determined by a set of 
worlds, and these worlds are not in general a subset of the worlds that determine the semantic 
value of ‘α will A in C’.  At the same time, the claim that one ought to A in C does not 




Proof:  [[ι ought to A in C]] ⊈ [[ι will A in C]] 
Because deontic sentences are evaluated with regard to different hyperplans than 
intentional sentences for any given deontic-intentional hyperstate, and because the non-
akratic condition is enforced only for intentional hyperplans, the semantic value of ‘ι ought 
to A in C’ will include hyperstates with worlds where ι will not A in C.   These worlds are 
not part of the hyperstates that provide the semantic value for [[ι will A in C]], and so [[ι 
ought to A in C]] is not a subset of [[ι will A in C]]. 
 
Notice that there is also a non-trivial semantic value for ‘ι shall A in C but ι ought not 
A in C’.  For [[ι shall A in C]] contains intentional plans where ι choose to A in C and worlds 
where ι choose to A in C, while [[ι ought not A in C]] contains deontic plans where ι single-
mindedly choose not to A in C.  Because the semantics of the former imposes no restriction 
on the deontic plans determined by the latter, and vice versa, there will be deontic-intentional 
hyperstates at the intersection of these two sentences.  It is true that in such a mental state one 
is in conflict with oneself over what one intends to do and what one thinks one should do, as 
exemplified by the fact that there is no decision one can make that satisfies both sets of plans.  
But alas, that is a feature of the mental life of sublunary beings.  Thus akrasia is possible even 
though the hyperstates that model akratic thoughts are non-akratic in the intention position.  
Furthermore, concerning collective intentions, if we were to follow Sellars and interpret 
‘ought’ in terms of ‘shallwe’ it would be hard to make sense of someone who said both ‘we 
ought to A’ and ‘we shall not A’.  But there are clearly cases where one can hold that a 
collective of which one is a member is about to do something which one thinks they ought 
not.
12
  At the same time the semantic value of a complex strong deontic, weak deontic, and 
                                                          
12
 Reflection on this point first led me to distinguish the deontic from the intentional hyperplan, though I have 
since become convinced that doing so, and the distinction between single-mindedness and indifference in the 
former, is central to an adequate understanding of practical rationality. 
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intentional sentence like ‘I ought to go to the lecture, I may sit in the front, I may sit in the 
back, and I shall sit in the front’ is well-defined as the intersection of the semantic values of 
the separate sentences:  
 
[[I ought to go to the lecture, I may sit in the front, I may sit in the back, and I shall sit in 
the front]] =  [[I ought to go to the lecture]] ⋂ [[I may sit in the front]] ⋂ [[I may sit in the 
back]] ⋂ [[I shall sit in the front]] = {<w, hD, hI>NA:  I single-mindedly choose to go to the 
lecture on hD} ⋂ {<w, hD, hI>NA:  I either single-mindedly choose to sit in the front or 
indifferently choose whether or not to sit in the front on hD} ⋂ {<w, hD, hI>NA:  I either 
single-mindedly choose to sit in the back or indifferently choose whether or not to sit in the 
back on hD} ⋂ {<w, hD, hI>NA:  I choose to sit in the front on hI} 
 
That this is a practically rational state of mind is reflected in the fact that, unlike the state of 
mind expressed by ‘I ought to A in C but I shall not’, there is a choice one can make that 
satisfies all of these sets of plans.  For the sets at the intersection of the middle two conjuncts 
rule out those deontic-intentional hyperstates where I choose, on the deontic hyperplan hD of 
the corresponding hyperstates, either single-mindedly to sit in the front or single-mindedly to 
sit in the back, and this leaves leaves only those hyperstates whose deontic hyperplans have 
me choosing indifferently to sit in either the front or the back.  In such a decided state the only 
way to conform both to one’s deontic and to one’s intentional plans is to choose indifferently 
to sit in the front – to do so, then, is to live up to the commitments one has expressed in 
making this complex deontic/intentional claim.  
Finally, the GENUINE AGENCY condition, and the fact that intentional hyperplans do 
not mark indifference and single-mindedness, ensures that the semantic values for the internal 




Proof:  [[it is not the case that ι shall A in C]] = [[ι shall not A in C]] 
By the definition of ‘shall’, [[ι shall A in C]] = {<w, hD, hI>NA:  ι choose to A in C on hI}.  
Call this set X.  The semantic value of the negation of ‘ι shall A in C’ is the complement of 
X.  It is a feature of agency, encoded in GENUINE AGENCY, that one can only choose to do 
something at a circumstance where one could also choose not to do it—otherwise the 
choice is no choice at all.  By the definition of hyperplans, then, if an agent does not 
choose to A in some circumstance C where she could, then the agent chooses not to A in C.  
Because intentional hyperplans concern only what the agent chooses to do and not do, it 
follows that the complement of X is {<w, hD, hI>NA:  ι choose not to A in C on hI}.  But 
this latter set is the semantic value of ‘ι shall not A in C’.   
 
By interpreting ‘shall’ in terms of either ‘shall-always’ or ‘shall-sometimes’ this equivalence 
would not hold. 
 
11.3.8  A NOTE ON BRATMAN’S THEORY OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS 
A more extended comparison of this theory of practical rationality with current work in the 
literature on collective intentionality is deferred for another time.  But there is one aspect of 
Michael Bratman’s proposal that this account nicely accommodates, and it does so in a way 
that illuminates a central commitment of Sellars about the identity and individuation of 
collective intentions.  In various places Bratman discusses the norms of rationality he 
associates with the planning states that lie at the back of collective intentions (cf. 2006, 2014, 
the Introduction to 2018, and the concise statement of his position in 2017), and he contends 
that an account of collective intentionality should also satisfy a condition of rational 




[M]y intention that we J…imposes rational pressure on me, as time goes by, to fill in my 
subplans in ways that fit with and support yours as you fill in your subplans; and vice 
versa. 
 
In defending the contention that rational pressure forces individuals who share a collective 
intention to fill in their individual plans in such a way as to realize that collective intention, 
Bratman writes (2010, p.8): 
 
A fundamental ground of these human capacities for temporally extended and shared 
intentional agency are human capacities for planning agency.  In saying that these planning 
capacities are a fundamental ground, I mean that the proper exercise of these planning 
capacities, given relevant contents of the plans, relevant contexts, and relevant inter-
relations with past, future, and others, will realize phenomena of temporally extended 
and/or shared intentional activity. 
 
On the hyperstate analysis provided here, the Boolean logic of set theory goes some way 
toward explaining how the norms of rationality associated with planning mental states enable 
those mental states to “realize phenomena of temporally extended and/or shared intentional 
activity”.   
This can be seen with an example.  Let Sα ⊆ SNADI denote the set of deontic-intentional 
hyperstates that models the content of the mental state of the agent α.  Suppose Alice and 
Bertolt share a collective intention to get a beer after the conference, but that no preferences 
for how to get to the pub have been specified (I am suppressing considerations of cognitivism 
– the question of whether those who share a collective intention must believe or know that 
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they do so).  Setting ‘α’ as ‘Alice’, ‘β’ as ‘Bertolt’ and ‘C’ as ‘after the conference’ this 
mental state is modelled by the hyperstate S1 such that:  
 
S1 = ({<w, hD, hI>NA:  α chooses to get a beer with β in C on hI} ⋂ {<w, hD, hI>NA:  β 
chooses to get a beer with α in C on hI}) 
 
Now, let us suppose that Bertolt proposes to Alice that they walk to the pub together, and that 
in doing so he comes to hold his part of the collective intention that they do so.  Bertold’s 
mental state (denoted ‘Sβ’) is now more restricted than S1, imposing as it does the additional 
requirement that Alice and Bertold walk together to the pub: 
 
Sβ = S1 ⋂ ({<w, hD, hI>NA:  α chooses to walk with β to the pub in C on hI} ⋂ {<w, hD, 
hI>NA:  β chooses to walk with α to the pub in C on hI}) 
 
For Alice and Bertold to share this collective intention, Alice will likewise need to restrict her 
hyperstates to those that include the collective intention to walk to the pub.  On this account, 
the rational pressure to fill in one’s individual plans to satisfy a collective intention (and the 
explanation of this phenomenon of collective intentionality) is reflected in the fact that more 
precise collective planning states are given by the intersection of the original states with the 
planning states that arise as a collective plan becomes more determinate.  Finally, notice that 
this semantics for collective intentions vindicates a claim made by Sellars (1968, p.217):  
“The intendings are two in number, but the content of these intendings is the same”.  Where 
Alice and Bertold share a collective intention, and where collective intentions are individuated 
by the individuals possessing them whereas their content is individuated by hyperstates, Alice 




11.4  SUMMING UP AND LOOKING AHEAD 
In this essay I have provided a hyperstate semantics sufficient to distinguish the descriptive, 
prescriptive, and intentional contents of various sentences and the mental states their 
assertions give voice to, and I have examined and put to criticism some of Sellars’ views in 
this vicinity.  In doing so I hope to have underwritten my contention that Sellars deserves to 
be placed alongside the ‘big four’ of collective intentionality as one of the significant figures 
in this tradition, and that Sellars’ views are deserving of more consideration in the literature 
on collective intentionality.  Beyond its historical relevance, this semantics offers the 
possibility of a common language for further investigation into issues of rationality, 
intentionality, and our shared social spaces.  For on the view developed here practical 
reasoning, moral reasoning and individual and collective intentions can all be understood 
through a common framework that handily accommodates various features of theoretical and 
practical rationality.  It also, I have suggested, sheds light on the nature of practical rationality 
as it is manifest in deontic and intentional cognition. 
 
APPENDIX:  DE RE AND DE DICTO MODALITY 
Consider the de dicto claim ‘it ought to be that every K chooses to A in C’ (e.g., it ought to be 
that anyone who is a member of my department attend the lecture).  We formalize this claim 
with kind-restricted quantification as follows: 
Ought(∀K,α)(α chooses to A in C) 
Intuitively, this says that, no matter who the Ks actually are, anything that were a K ought to 
A in C.  The de re claim ‘every K ought to choose to A in C’ (everyone who is a member of 
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my department ought to attend the lecture), by contrast, says that every actual K is such that it 
ought to A in C: 
(∀K,α)Ought(α chooses to A in C) 
To discriminate the semantic values of de re and de dicto occurrences of the deontic modals, 
it is correspondingly necessary to relativize semantic values to points of evaluation.  Each 
point of evaluation assigns an object as an extension to every term, a set of objects as the 
extension of every quantifier, an n-tuple of objects to every n-place predicate, etc.  In order to 
evaluate de re modal claims, principles of identity and individuation are then needed in order 
to track individuals across different points of evaluation.  Consideration of possible-worlds 
analyses helps illustrate the point.  In a possible-worlds semantics the de dicto claim is true at 
a world w just in case every morally-best world w1 accessible from w is such that the 
following holds:  every K at w1 chooses to A in C at w1.  In this case one only looks at how 
otherworldly Ks behave at those other worlds.  By contrast, the de re claim is true at a world 
w just in case every morally-best world w1 that is accessible from w is such that the following 
holds:  every K at w chooses to A in C at w1.  De re modality thus involves a principle of 
transworld identification – to evaluate de re occurrences of a modal we have to consider what 
the actual Ks (the individual Ks at the point of evaluation) are doing at other worlds.   
Even though a hyperstate semantics makes use of plans to evaluate the contents of 
prescriptive and intentional mental states, in addition to worlds, the difference between de re 
and de dicto deontic modality can be modelled on a hyperstate semantics if we relativize the 
semantic evaluation of sentences to worlds alone.  Letting [[φ]]w denote the semantic value of 
φ at a world w, and where ‘@’ denotes the world of evaluation (in the usual case, the actual 
world), the de dicto occurrence of the strong deontic modality is interpreted as follows: 
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[[ought(∀K,α)(α chooses to A in C)]]@ =def.. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  every K in w single-
mindedly chooses to A in C on hD} 
The de re occurrence receives the following interpretation: 
[[(∀K,α)ought(α A chooses to A in C)]]@ =def.. {<w, hD, hI>NA:  every K in @ single-
mindedly chooses to A in C on hD} 
De re and de dicto talk of permissions and prohibitions can be understood in the same 
manner.   
Notice that just as the interpretation of de re modality on a possible-worlds semantics 
requires tracking individuals from the actual world to various possible worlds, so does de re 
modality require tracking agents from the actual world to the plan-elements of various 
hyperstates.  But on a hyperstate semantics a principle of identifying and individuating 
individuals across worlds and plans is already needed for de dicto modality, and in future 
work I hope to examine such principles in more detail. 
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